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BIOETHICS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL, SOCIO-LEGAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS FOR A BRAVE NEW WORLD. By
George P. Smith, II. New York and London: University Press
of America, Inc. 1993. 332 Pp. $56.00 (cloth); $29.50
(paperback).
Reviewed by Patrick T. Clendenen*
How many good creatures are there here! How beauteous man-
kind is! 0 brave new world, That has such people in't!1
Until recently,2 broad-based bioethical and biotechnological discourse
in contemporary public America was noticeably absent in this age of
health care reform,3 and the lack of any serious discussion whatsoever is
attributable in part to ignorance.' Knee-jerk sentimentality, emotion-fil-
* Associate, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.; A.B., 1988, Colby
College; J.D., 1991, The Catholic University of America; 1991-1993, Law Clerk to The
Honorable Ellen Bree Burns, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 5, sc. 1. See generally William
Domnarski, Shakespeare in the Law, 67 CONN. B.J. 317 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Sharon Begley, One Pill Makes You Larger, And One Pill Makes You
Small .... NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 37; Philip Elmer-Dewitt, The Genetic Revolution,
TIME, Jan. 17, 1994, at 46.
3. See, e.g., President's Address to the Joint Session of Congress on Health Care Re-
form, 84 Health Care Facility Mgmt. (CCH) 1, 3 (Sept. 22, 1993) ("Millions of Americans
are just a pink slip away from losing their health insurance and one serious illness away
from losing all their savings."); Health Care Reform Proposal and Health Security Act, 87
Health Care Facility Mgmt. (CCH) 1 (Nov. 1, 1993); Peter D. Fox, Foreword to THE IN-
SIDER'S GUIDE TO MANAGED CARE: A LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL ROADMAP 11 (Doug-
las A. Hastings et al. eds., 1990)("Imposing an economic discipline on the health care
system is essential, but society needs to assure that its most vulnerable members are pro-
tected in the process."); Reforming Health Care: The Patient's-Eye View, ECONOMIST, Dec.
18, 1993, at 24.
4. See DIANA B. DUTTON, WORSE THAN THE DISEASE: PITFALLS OF MEDICAL PRO-
GRESS 350 (1988) ("[W]e who use medicine's innovations, who bear their risks, and who,
both as taxpayers and as consumers, pay for the products and the research that made them
possible, have little if anything to say about the nature and pace of medical progress.");
The Gene Jury, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1993, at 79 ("Biotechnology is a subject which most
people feel neither enlightened about nor in control of."). This criticism has even been
made of the very purveyors of bioethical wisdom. See SHERMAN ELIAS & GEORGE J.
ANNAS, REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS AND THE LAW xi (1987)("Medical and scientific writers
tend to ignore social policy issues, and lawyers and ethicists tend to misunderstand or ig-
nore medical and scientific facts.").
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led responses, and division, rather than deliberation and balancing, are
the more common phenomena in national bioethical and biotechnologi-
cal disputes.' In this political landscape and for those who see the pros-
pect of a brave new world as "a mysterious mixture of promise and
threat, probably important but fatefully ill-defined,"6 George P. Smith's
Bioethics and the Law provides a welcome reminder that not only the
legal but also the medical and scientific communities7 as a whole should
deliberate and "consider anew the extent to which the plethora of medi-
cal, legal, scientific and technological considerations of [today] would
either challenge or complement both the traditional rights of humanity
and those being redefined according to contemporary values and
standards." 8
In Smith's view, the contemporary discourse on bioethics and the law
needs to be more proactive9 in
5.. See GEORGE P. SMITH, 1I, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL, SOCIO-LEGAL
AND PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS FOR A BRAVE NEW WORLD 197 (1993) (In the realm of.
surrogation, "law must operate within a rational structure and not a vortex of sentimental-
ity.") (endnote omitted); id. at 186 (In the sterilization decision, "[r]easoned analysis, not
emotional passion should be the watchword for action."); id. at 202 (In the surrogation
decision, "[w]hile it may well be 'desirable for the child to have contact with both parents'
the issue must be settled by application of the standard of reasonableness - and not a
'standard' of emotionalism.") (endnote omitted).
6. The Gene Jury, supra note 4, at 79; see also William Miller, British Debate: Does
Fertility Science Break "Natural Law"?, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9, 1994, at A2 ("The public
may still be alarmed that the frontiers of medical science are being pushed forward too far
and too fast.").
7. Professor Smith may even wish to go so far, as the British Government apparently
has, as to include "juries" of informed laymen to influence the course of biotechnological
policy. Although the British experiment presently is limited to contemporary issues in
plant biotechnology, the "discussion will be carefully watched by Britain's Medical Re-
search Council, which is pondering whether to hold consensus conferences on medical bio-
technology and genetic engineering." The Gene Jury, supra note 4, at 79; see SMITH, supra
note 5, at 6 ("[T]he creation of ethical guidelines for the application of the New Biology
[should draw] on the skills of lawyers, legislators, theologians, philosophers, humanists,
social scientists, and laymen." (endnote omitted)); see also William Miller, British Debate:
Does Fertility Science Break "Natural Law"?, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9, 1994, at A2 (Britain's
Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority "called on members of the public together
with doctors, scientists, and theologians to present their views on the ethical, moral and
legal, implications" of using eggs and ovarian tissue taken from aborted fetuses and corpses
"to create babies in infertile women.").
8. SMITH, supra note 5, at iii; see also George J. Annas, Doctors and Lawyers and
Wolves, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 437, 449 (1989) ("Unless lawyers and doctors, ethicists and the
public, can work together to constructively confront [today's] critical questions, we will
wind up as King Lear did when he died.").
9. SMITH, supra note 5, at iv ("Law, science and medicine must become full, unlim-
ited partners in the bioethical ventures of modern society.").
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the task of assuring the primary goal of society, itself: namely,
that all citizens be provided with an equal opportunity to
achieve their maximum potential for human growth, develop-
ment, interpersonal relations, and intellectual fulfillment when it
exists, within the economic market place as well as the market
place of ideals and to have not only their physical suffering mini-
mized and their spiritual tranquility assured, but their rights of
autonomy and/or self-determination recognized.' °
To achieve this goal, Smith utilizes a utilitarian construct for decisionmak-
ing that is a recurring theme for his recommendations in the situational
dilemmas of the day: that is, a balancing test that not only "seeks to yield
a final action that minimizes human suffering and maximizes the social
good"" but also utilizes "the new and startling discoveries of the twenty-
first century with a spirit of beneficence, autonomy and distributive jus-
tice.""2 In this vein, Smith urges society to embrace, rather than shirk,
both the possibilities and responsibilities of the brave new world.' 3 As
such, Smith has written a book not just for lawyers, judges, doctors, and
nurses because its breadth and scope touch upon the totality of contem-
porary human relationships.' 4
Because Bioethics and the Law has at its core the laudable goal of facil-
itating a dialogue and creating a decisional construct that both under-
scores the enormous potential for social good (e.g., the relief of pain and
suffering and the battle with disease) offered by recent advances in genet-
ics and biotechnology and points to aspects of the new biology that could
10. Id. (endnote omitted).
11. Id.
12. Id. Professor Smith is a case utilitarian rather than a rule utilitarian. See George
P. Smith, II, Biomedicine and Bioethics: De Lege Lata, De Lege Ferenda, 9 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 233, 239 (1993) ("Case utilitarians, on the other hand, would weigh
the good that each separate case or situation would provide.").
13. "Society should encourage, not stifle, research; for a society unable to accept and
encourage either current or future behavioral variations does not promote a hospitable
environment for the free development and expression of ideas of any kind. Man cannot
learn by merely thinking in this area." SmiTH, supra note 5, at 6 (endnote omitted); see
also id. at 126 ("The obvious implication of these restrictions on embryonic and fetal re-
search is that the scientific pursuit of mankind is significantly handicapped."); id. at 259-60
("The quest for maximum utilization of biological and medical knowledge represents but
one of the tenets of modern 'evolutionary wisdom."') (endnote omitted).
14. See George P. Smith, II, Book Review, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 443,
445-46 (1991) (reviewing IAN KENNEDY & ANDREW GRUBB, MEDICAL LAW: TEXT AND
MATERIALS (1989)) ("Health Law exists because health care is not a thing so much as it is
a relationship between individuals: doctors and patients, patients and families, health care
providers and health care institutions.").
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lead to abuse,' 5 Smith, at first glance, takes on a remarkably broad
agenda. Professor Smith does, however, provide the detail necessary to
illustrate how his construct might work in practice. Indeed, by relying on
both a descriptive and normative discussion of at least eleven major top-
ics, Smith develops his conception of a utilitarian brave new world with-
out failing to articulate his vision in the situational dilemmas of the day.
In chapter one, entitled "Ethical Challenges," Smith first critiques the
contemporary debate over medical ethics and contends that, although
"the most striking weakness found is the lack of a basic yardstick against
which either the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of a physician's actions may be
measured,"' 6 an interdependent framework for decisionmaking does ex-
ist, and, even though it fluctuates with the particulars of the situation," it
must be both competent and moral, combining the three keystones of
Bioethics: Autonomy, Beneficence, and Justice. 8 Second, Smith criti-
ques the societal urge to stop all research because "we lack total knowl-
edge."' 9 This view, Smith contends, not only forecloses opportunities "to
grow in wisdom and use that wisdom to act with dignity and responsibil-
ity'20 but also ignores societal responsibilities to serve mankind.
21
Although his optimistic view of medical progress is not universally em-
braced,22 Professor Smith, without ignoring the significant dangers that
15. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 5, at 97 ("[T]here is always a danger-real or im-
plied-that the institutional review board system-as with all self-regulatory systems, will
favor inherently (by virtue of their composition) the interests of researchers."); id. at 290
("The biggest uncertainty surrounding living wills and their subsequent administration is
related to whether health care providers are required - under pain of civil or criminal
sanction - to execute the terms of the will.").
16. Id. at 1.
17. Id. at 260 ("A situation ethic considers the consequences of each proposed bi-
omedical action, carefully weighs them and concludes with an ethical posture or the struc-
turing of a penultimate standard of modus operandi.") (endnote omitted).
18. Id. at 6. The morality Professor Smith espouses is not a new one to fit his personal
likes; rather, it is morality that is "'discovered' by an unpacking, explication and articula-
tion of individual intuitions about what ought be undertaken and what ought not be done."
Id. at 15.
19. Id. at 13.
20. Id.
21. Id. ("[Mian often chooses the path of ignorance to escape the burdens of responsi-
bility that arise from new knowledge.").
22. DuTroN, supra note 4, at 350-51 ("[Mledical and scientific 'advances' can do harm
as well as good, and ... judgments about both risks and benefits are not automatic or
absolute but are made by individuals and agencies acting in the context of particular social,
political, and economic pressures."). See generally DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF
LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS (1990) (analyzing the converging and conflict-
ing forces of improved medical technology, cost-effective treatment, and health care for all
citizens); MEDICAL INNOVATION AND BAD OUTCOMES: LEGAL, SOCIAL AND ETHICAL RE-
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exist in conducting (and applying the fruits of) research,23 crafts a persua-
sive argument to consider the benefits and dangers concurrently. 24 Only
then, Smith contends, can a true balancing take place.
Central to Smith's construct for principled decisionmaking is an eco-
nomic balancing test which weighs the costs and benefits of maintaining
the status quo and undertaking new courses of action, with an emphasis
on making informed, competent, and self-critical decisions. Ultimately,
however, Smith contends that because bioethics deals fundamentally with
human beings and medical technology, rather than, for example, pesticide
technology, these decisions must be made with an overriding respect for,
and appreciation of, the individual in a micro and macroeconomic
sense. The stuff of econometrics Smith's theory is not.
To elucidate his theory, Smith has collected, edited, revised, and rear-
ranged a wealth of his previously published work and his lectures and
papers delivered around the world, to set forth a comprehensive set of
essays which comprise "the conundrums that beckon us into the new Mil-
lennium."26 Moreover, the scope of Bioethics and the Law is remarkably
ambitious, for it covers not only genetics, assisted suicide, informed con-
SPONSES (Mark Siegler et al. eds., 1987) (noting and analyzing in a collection of essays the
public's demand for continuing technological advancement in medicine and the pitfalls of
innovation's mistakes).
23. Those dangers surround not only the present generation but also future genera-
tions. SMiTH, supra note 5, at 14 ("The creed encompasses a corresponding commitment to
live life and influence the lives of others to promote the evolution of a better world for
future generations by avoiding actions that would detrimentally impact the future.")
(endnote omitted).
24. For example, in discussing research on in vitro fertilization, Smith argues that
"[r]esearch into the impact of biomedical technologies and consideration of the ethical
dilemmas involved does not require a moratorium on human experimentation; the two can
continue concurrently." Id. at 6. Similarly, in Chapter 10. entitled "Of Clones and Cry-
ons," Smith notes that, although "the total cryonic suspension of an entire human body and
its revival remains speculative at best .... scientific actions which hold the promise, no
matter how remote, of increasing the quality of purposeful living and minimizing suffering
must be pursued." Id. at 265; see also id. at 264 (Because it "is only by continued effort
that real progress through education can be achieved" in the field of asexual reproduction,
"[i]mpatience with the unknown and terror over spontaneity must be conquered.").
25. Id. at iii ("The legal and ethical evaluations and constructions of law, medicine,
biotechnology and genetic engineering need to be set within a continuing dialogue that is
tied to a basic understanding of and respect for human rights and human dignity.").
26. Id. at back bookcover (as described by The Honorable Michael Kirby, President,
Court of Appeal, Sydney, Australia). The titles to the chapters of Smith's book are as
follows: Ch. 1, Ethical Challenges; Ch. 2, Rationing Health Care; Ch. 3, Ethics Commit-
tees; Ch. 4, Informed Decisionmaking; Ch. 5, Embryonic and Fetal Experimentations; Ch.
6, Wrongful Life or Wrongful Birth; Ch. 7, Procreational Restraints; Ch. 8, Surrogation;
Ch. 9, Fetal Abuse; Ch. 10, Of Clones and Cryons; Ch. 11, The Right to Die with Dignity.
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sent, and rationing health care, but also contains chapters entitled "Em-
bryonic and Fetal Experimentations," "Fetal Abuse," and "Of Clones
and Cryons." In addition to its international scope and depth, which is
the result of Smith's extensive travel and study abroad,27 Bioethics and
the Law is timely, which any reading of the contemporary press will
reveal.28
27. See, e.g., id. at 29 (Britain's national health care system); id. at 38-39 (Sheffield
Standards for determining whether to withhold care from handicapped infants); id. at 46-47
(Akamba people's approach to allocating medical resources); id. at 127 (fetal experimenta-
tion in Britain); id. at 180-86 (Canadian and British approaches to procreational restraints,
such as sterilization); id. at 205-06 (Britain's approach to surrogation and artificial insemi-
nation); Id. at 296-97 (Canadian and British approaches to assisted suicide).
28. On fetal experimentation, compare SMITh, supra note 5, at 124-27 (the federal
position) with Paul Recer, US Funds Fetal Tissue Research, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3, 1994, at
A3 ("The federalgovernment yesterday approved the first grant for fetal tissue research
since President Clinton lifted a five-year ban on studies using cells from aborted fetuses.").
See also SMITH, supra note 5, at 130-32 (discussing the Waxman Bill and President Clin-
ton's lifting of the moratorium on federal funding of research involving fetal tissue from
abortions). On fetal experimentation and surrogation, compare SMITH, supra note 5, at
127-28, 204-07 with Neil Davis, Comment: The Constitutionality of Fetal Experimentation
Statutes: The Case of Lifchez v. Hartigan, 25 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 37, 38-40 (1992);
William Miller, British Debate: Does Fertility Science Break "Natural Law"?, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 9, 1994, at A2 (utilization of eggs and ovarian tissue taken from aborted fe-
tuses and corpses "to create babies in infertile women"); Not Too Late, ECONOMIST, Jan. 8,
1994, at 78-79 (recounting the European debate about embryo transfer for older, infertile
women). On genetic policy and gene mapping and therapy, compare SMITH, supra note 5,
at i-iii, 172-76, with China Proposes Eugenics Law, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1993, at A6
("China introduced a bill to use abortions and sterilizations to avoid 'births of inferior
quality and heighten the standards of the whole population"'); MegaYAC Map, ECONO-
MIST, Dec. 18, 1993, at 78-79 (recounting the year's development in gene mapping); More
Than It Can Bear, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, at 86 (gene therapy possibilities for coronary
heart disease). On human and fetal experimentation and informed consent, compare
SMITH, supra note 5, at 89-90, 99-102, 117-18 with Silent Death, ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 1994, at
77-78 (describing the US Atomic Energy Commission's experiments on the effects of radi-
ation exposure on human beings, "some without their knowledge"); Arthur Caplan, For
the US, A Shamefid Legacy of the Cold War, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 1994, at All ("Didn't
anyone take seriously the Nuremberg Code, issued by US judges at the conclusion of these
trials, that made informed consent an absolute, inviolate requirement for all research in-
volving human subjects?"); Cincinnati Patients Irradiated in '72, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6,
1994, at A19; Sean P. Murphy, Prison "Trips" Altered 2 Inmates' Paths, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 6, 1994, at 21 (LSD experiments conducted by Timothy Leary); see also George J.
Annas, Mengele's Birthmark: The Nuremberg Code in United States Courts, 7 J. CoNTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 17 (1991); ROBERT N. PROCTOR, RACIAL HYGIENE: MEDICINE
UNDER THE NAZIS 217-22 (1988). On Institutional Review Boards, clinical trials, and drug
research, compare SMITH, supra note 5, at 96-98 with Daniel Golden, Stakes High in
Clinical Drug Trials, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 1994, at Al, A13 (recounting the problems
associated with the safety of omniflox, a newly-approved antibiotic, and the flawed
processes of some clinical trials and institutional review boards). On rationing health care
and the Oregon experiment, compare SMITH, supra note 5, at 25-36 with Tracy Erwin, The
Book Review
Although Smith's philosophy of principled decisionmaking is a unique
and sensitive construct in its concordant emphasis on societal and individ-
ual welfare, it fits better in some areas of the book than others. For ex-
ample, in this and other works,29 Professor Smith argues persuasively that
the use of costly medical resources for terminally ill, inoperable, or brain
dead individuals is not only an unreasonable and inefficient use of exotic
and scarce medical resources but also inhumane and unjust. Smith argues
that, although "[s]ocial justice demands that each individual be given an
opportunity to maximize his individual potential,"3 when an individual is
so disabled or ill, lacking "any 'truly human' qualities or relational-poten-
tial, then the best form of treatment should be arguably no treatment at
all.",3 ' As such, the "attainment of the quality of purposeful, humane liv-
ing becomes a coordinate or complement to total economic utility."
32
In chapter eleven, moreover, Smith recounts the varied and contempo-
rary statutory and medical definitions of death which "endeavor to place
and to recognize the moment of death earlier in the continuum of life
than earlier practice and definitional structure did."' 33 Smith argues that
Oregon Plan: An Ethical Solution to the Health Care Crisis?, 26 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L.
133, 135-37 (1993); Marilyn Chase, Oregon's New Health Rationing Means More Care for
Some But Less for Others, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1994, at B1. On assisted suicide and the
right to die, compare SMITH, supra note 5, at 300-02 with Michigan v. Kevorkian, 62
U.S.L.W. 2411 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1993); Dick Lehr, Seattle Group Sues to Void
Suicide Ban, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1994, at A7 (describing an action in U.S. District
Court "seeking to overturn on constitutional grounds the state's criminal ban against as-
sisted-suicide"); Dick Lehr, Supporting Those Who Want to Die, BosToN GLOBE, Jan. 18,
1994, at A3 (describing the organization "Compassion in Dying," which offers "face-to-
face guidance on suicide").
29. See, e.g., George P. Smith, II, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of As-
sisted Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv.
275, 418 (1989), cited in Cruzan v. Director of Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 n.8
(1990)).
30. SMrrH, supra note 5, at 48.
31. Id. (endnote omitted).
32. Id. at 49 (endnote omitted); see also id. ("Or, stated otherwise, decisions regarding
the allocation of health care services should be reached by balancing the gravity of the
economic harm that will accrue in a particular case of use or maintenance against the utility
of the social good that will occur if that resource is not used.").
33. Id. at 303-04 (Because of medical technology, death today is more complex:
"Man's physiological system does not collapse and fail in a moment's time."); see also
Commonwealth v. Golston, 366 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Mass. 1977) (recognizing the so-called
"Harvard Standards" for determining brain death as the legal standard of death);
KAREN G. GERVAIS, REDEFINING DEATH 167-68, 207 (1986) (Subject to a conscience
clause, human death occurs where there is irreversible cessation of brain functions neces-
sary for consciousness.); Annas, supra note 8, at 444-45 (summarizing the advent of brain
death statutes and decisions); Steven Goldberg, The Changing Face of Death: Computers,
Consciousness, and Nancy Cruzan, 173 SPECIALTY L. Diu.: HEALTH CARE L. 7, 29-31
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these developments, when coupled with an overall recognition of patient
autonomy and enlightened self-determination, not only allow for a more
dignified and merciful death "but also preclude the assessment of heavy
economic burdens of caring for one who has lost the basic attributes or
indicators of personhood."34 To Smith, therefore, death is in large part a
function of the indicia of a person's meaningful life.35 Thus, although
Smith recognizes the primacy of a physician's duty "to eschew patient
harm," he also counsels the medical community to realize that "humane
and individualized care may well direct his assistance in assuring the im-
plementation of his patient's right to death with dignity. '36
In this age of health care reform, cost containment and patient auton-
omy coalesce nicely to reduce the use of technology for those who do not
want it. Indeed, at both the state and federal level, the courts and legisla-
tures have supported the patient's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
and have created devices to carry out that right, such as living wills and
durable powers of attorney.37 Whether these developments, including
the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1989,38 are based largely on a new
appreciation for patient autonomy or a new recognition of the old con-
cern for the bottom line, or both (and one suspects the latter), it is clear
to Smith that "the whole health care provider system will be able to de-
liver its services more efficiently and economically without undue judicial
interference and supervision. '39
(July 1993) (discussing the impact of the development of "self-aware" machines on soci-
ety's definition of death and the resultant treatment decisions of terminally-ill patients);
SMITH, supra note 5, at 268-71 (discussing the various definitions of death and their impli-
cations for "individuals presently in cryonic suspension of those anticipating its use"); Rob-
ert W. Pommer, III, Commentary, Donaldson v. Van de Kamp: Cryonics, Assisted Suicide,
and the Challenges of Medical Science, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTh L. & POL'Y 589, 603 (1993)
(discussing cryonic suspension before "natural" death).
34. SMITH, supra note 5, at 303. As an added benefit, Smith notes that "the body parts
that survive death-as thus newly classified and defined-may be harvested and made
available to deserving recipients without the physicians being fearful and uncertain that
their acts might be considered invasions of privacy or criminal assaults." Id. (endnote
omitted).
35. Professor Smith sees meaningful life in the context of personhood, which, as he
defines it broadly, is the enjoyment of states of consciousness, the capacity to have exper-
iences linked together by memory, and the capacity for love and interpersonal relation-
ships. Id. at 285.
36. Id. at 302.
37. See id. at 290-93.
38. See id. 297-98; see also Barbara Mishkin, Advance Directives for Health Care, in
1993 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 363 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1993).
39. SMITH, supra note 5, at 298.
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Contrary to at least one published report,' Smith sees no offense to
the principle of nonmaleficence in a patient's enlightened exercise of to-
tal control over comfort care on the edge of life. In this light, "the con-
cept of euthanasia is relegated to obscurity or nonuse and-in its place-
enlightened self-determination is the primary vector of force or para-
mount goal in decisionmaking.
' 41
The question then becomes whether, under Smith's theory, patient au-
tonomy and cost containment will, on the edge of life, create disharmony
in the public's eye and within the medical profession in part because utili-
tarianism argues that it is in our own interest to maximize the utility of
all.42 Indeed, whether the issue is rationing health care in general or as-
sisted suicide, questions remain that will test Smith's theory when patient
autonomy and cost containment diverge. For example, will the mandate
to control costs for society's good overrun a patient's decision (on reli-
gious or moral grounds, or purely out of self-preservation) to use technol-
ogy to live in whatever form that life takes place?43 Can we value
personhood and quality of life to override a patient's wish to receive the
benefits of technology when they are not "worth" the cost? When a pa-
tient either expresses, or cannot express, the will to live rather than die in
this era of cost containment, "to what extent are physicians required to
furnish access to health care regardless of resource constraints?"'
40. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, LIFE-SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES AND
THE ELDERLY 145 (1987) ("Since the need to change society's standard in order to allow
mercy killing to relieve pain and suffering is uncertain, and since such a change presents
potential dangers to society through abuse, decline of trust within medical relationships,
and the threat to the principle of nonmaleficence that prohibits killing, there do not appear
to be sufficient reasons to change the prohibition against killing.").
41. SMITH, supra note 5, at 302; see also National Conference on Birth, Death and Law,
29 JURIMETRICS J. 403, 432 (1989) (The conference "concluded that it should be lawful,
under certain circumstances, for a physician to assist a patient who chooses to end his or her
life by the introduction of a lethal agent.").
42. See, e.g., JOHN L. MOTHERSHEAD, JR., ETHICS: MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT 241 (1955) (critiquing utilitarianism as an ethical theory because of
its tendencies to mimic egoistic hedonism, naturalism, and intuitionism).
43. See Matthew R. Gregory, Hard Choices: Patient Autonomy in an Era of Health
Care Cost Containment, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 483, 484 (1990) ("Once the doctor has disclosed
all treatment possibilities, including those she has ruled out, because the costs outweigh the
benefits in her judgment, the patient may well demand additional treatment notwithstand-
ing the doctor's recommendation.").
44. Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of Scarce Re-
sources: Is There a Duty to Treat?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 349 (1993), reprinted in 176 SPE-
CIALTY L. DIG.: HEALTH CARE L. 9, 12 (1993). Mehlman argues that, although "these
cost containment efforts may be designed to achieve a societal goal of reducing health care
costs, they impact directly on patients by creating the risk that physicians will withhold
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Although Smith and others no doubt would respond that "[r]ational peo-
ple would not want their insurance to cover every last ounce of beneficial
and desirable care, 45 the questions remain and are perhaps unanswer-
able as a rule.46 Perhaps, too, the more important question is who will
decide-a doctor, a judge, a legislator-and how will that decisionmaker
go about making his decision?
In chapter three of his book, Smith answers that question in part by
providing a framework for principled decisionmaking in a relatively new
organization within the hospital: the ethics committee.47 Although he
envisions the limited use of ethics committees,48 he also extends the tradi-
tional advisory concept of an ethics committee to encourage a model that
assists patients in exercising their rights of self-determination by petition
to an ethical tribunal comprising "a wide sampling of independent indi-
viduals." The tribunal has the power, after applying substantive stan-
dards and employing procedural safeguards, "to decide the issue before it
[:]" whether a patient may "be assisted in ending his life." 4 9
beneficial medical services." 176 SPECIALTY L. DIG.: HEALTH CARE L. at 11; see also
PRESIDENT'S COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDI-
CAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT:
A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL. MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 95-
100 (1983) (Although society "is not obligated to provide every intervention that the pa-
tient or provider believe might be beneficial," the Commission advocates first the develop-
ment of rationing principles generally, which may later be applied "to issues at the end of
life.") (footnote omitted).
45. Robert M. Veatch, Physicians and Cost Containment: The Ethical Conflict, 30
JURIMETRICS J. 461, 466 (1990).
46. Compare SMITH, supra note 5, at 32 (arguing that the physician's role as a de facto
gatekeeper "presents no real conflict with the patient's good; for not only are economics
and ethics in congruence, but also are individual and social good as well as the doctor's and
patient's interests") (endnote omitted) and George P. Smith, II, Biomedicine and
Bioethics: De Lege Lata, De Lege Ferenda, 9 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 233, 243
(1993) ("Under proper conditions, the principle of respect for autonomy can be overridden
or infringed upon.") and Tom Tomlinson & Howard Brody, Futility and the Ethics of Re-
suscitation, 264 JAMA 1276, 1277 (1990) ("Actions that do not contribute to [the good of
the patient] are not morally required.") with Dieter Giesen, Vindicating the Patient's Rights:
A Comparative Perspective, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 273, 306 (1993) (describing
the general role of doctor as "increasingly seen as one of assisting the patient in the exer-
cise of his rights") and Robert M. Veatch & Carol M. Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The
Role of the Physician in Setting Limits, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 36 (1992) (arguing that a
physician has a duty to treat in spite of his conscience).
47. See PRESIDENT'S COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT
DECISIONS app. F (1983).
48. SMITH, supra note 5, at 74.
49. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
Book Review
Of the several alternative models of principled decisionmaking, ° Pro-
fessor Smith shuns the ephemeral for the concrete. He endorses a utilita-
rian model based in substantial part on the principles of cost-benefit
analysis. 5 ' This principle and the guidelines used by such a committee are
not absolute, however, because "[love, compassion and humaneness
should perhaps be the primary constants in all deliberations of a hospital
ethics committee." 2 In the best of all possible worlds, Smith endorses
the proposal of Professor John C. Fletcher, which establishes an ethics
committee as but one component of a total hospital ethics program that
not only resolves clinical care dilemmas but also provides "on-going edu-
cational and ethical consulting services."53
Chapter four, entitled "Informed Decisionmaking," is not so much a
proof of Professor Smith's theorem as a means of effectuating on a micro-
level the goal of minimizing human suffering and maximizing the social
good. Since patients have the autonomy to decide their destiny,
[the] information disclosed must be complete, clear and under-
standable in the patient's own language so that he is thereby
allowed to know not only the nature of his illness, its prognosis
and the alternative modes of treatment together with their cost
and probabl[e] effectiveness, but [also] the levels of discomfort
and side effects on the ultimate quality of life.54
In his analysis, Smith distinguishes between lay and professional stan-
dards of informed consent (recommending the latter),55 and describes the
ethics of human experimentation in prisons and under the auspices of
institutional review boards, fetal consent, proxy consent, and informed
refusal. Although the absence of a normative conclusion to this chapter
left it incomplete under Smith's overarching theory, the descriptive and
normative elements of each subpart, especially its discussion for judges
and lawyers dealing with informed consent claims before juries,56 serve as
50. Id. at 68-70 (Teleological, Deontological, Personalistic, and Integrative).
51. Id. at 70 ("Under the utilitarian model, the controlling premise is that an act is
good and meritorious if it promotes an increase of pleasure or good over pain for a major-
ity of members in a defined community.").
52. Id.
53. Id. at 72.
54. Id. at 81.
55. Id. at 87 ("The wiser approach to develop here would be to acknowledge the stan-
dard for medical acceptability as being based solely on the perception of the reasonable
practitioner.") (endnote omitted).
56. Id. at 87-89. For example, he notes that, before juries, the signature of a patient on
the consent form is frequently determinative, id. at 89, when in fact the "participatory
moral agency" between physician and patient focuses on "disclosure of all those levels of
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strong process-based support for achieving Smith's utilitarian goals. Fur-
thermore, Smith perceptively points to the often overlooked moral obli-
gations of the patient himself, principally to be truthful and faithful to his
health care provider.57 Hence, Smith aptly recognizes that with the pa-
tient's rights of autonomy and self-determination come corresponding
duties and obligations.
In his discussion of informed consent, Smith further provides both an
excellent discussion of the ethics of human experimentation in therapeu-
tic, nontherapeutic, and mixed settings and a concise presentation of "the
conundrum of whether it is necessary to disclose to the patient that an
experiment is being conducted and the very nature of the experiment it-
self."58 Although Smith describes as "unquestioned" the duty to obtain
informed consent in mixed therapeutic and nontherapeutic experimenta-
tion, Smith's utilitarian theory neither addresses nor balances whether
the principle of beneficence can override the principle of autonomy in
randomized clinical trials that inexorably place the goals of research and
potentially greater societal benefits at odds with the patient's
autonomy.5 9
Consistent with his thesis, Professor Smith provides concrete guidance
in other areas and debunks several myths he sees recurring within the
contemporary evolution of bioethics and the law.
For example, Smith sees embryonic and fetal experimentation, "pur-
sued as such in a reasonable and humane manner, ,60 as a necessary in-
information necessary for the patient to make a valid choice and genuine consent to surgi-
cally invasive or non-invasive medical treatments." Id. at 81. Perhaps, Professor Smith
therefore believes that consent forms only should be considered nondispositive evidence of
consent under all of the circumstances.
57. Id. at 82.
58. Id. at 90.
59. For example, Robert Veatch has, on the theory that the principle of beneficence
can never override the principle of autonomy, stated that "it is never acceptable on
grounds of scientific need to withhold preliminary data that persons would reasonably
want," unless the patient agrees in advance. ROBERT M. VEATCH, THE PATIENT AS PART-
NER: A THEORY OF HUMAN-EXPERIMENTATION ETHICS 11, 152 (1987). Smith does, how-
ever, critique the medical profession for its failure "ethically to use placebo trials ... on
AIDS patients." SMITH, supra note 5, at 98. See generally ARNOLD J. RosoFF, INFORMED
CONSENT: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 257-64 (1981) (advocating the need
for informed consent and special constraints on human experimentation); FAY A. Rozov-
SKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 117-22, 570-76 (2d ed. 1984) (pla-
cebo trials and statutory precedent in human research); ARTHUR F. SOUTHWICK &
DEBORA A. SLEE, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 369-73
(1988) (informed consent for innovative therapy, medical research, or experimentation).
60. SMITH, supra note 5, at 115.
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strument of medical research and progress with a goal "to correct [costly]
genetic anomalies or prevent subsequent disease through actual surgical
intervention."61 While noting the often overlooked Nuremberg Code6 2
and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act in discussing the ethical imperative
on physicians and researchers to obtain the separate and informed con-
sent of women who decide to abort and then donate the fetal tissue,63
Smith concomitantly debunks the entire notion that fetal transplants will
have an impact on the abortion decision. 64
By examining the crux of society's inertia and "evaluating the very real
dangers of not undertaking research in the first instance,"65 Smith argues
that, for the maximization of the social good, "it is ethically acceptable to
use tissue from abortuses for research" under controlled and ethically rig-
orous guidelines,66 such as those issued in a report by the Stanford Uni-
versity Medical Center Committee on Ethics.67 As a metaphor for his
philosophy on scientific intervention in whatever form, Professor Smith
sees such research as a necessary vehicle to minimize human suffering
and to maximize "sustained qualitative living within reasonable cost
restraints.,
68
Similarly, in chapter seven, entitled "Procreational Restraints," Smith
recounts the economic and social costs of genetic disease on a society
with limited resources. Smith argues that, when the procedure is "truly
voluntary,69 and analyzed rigorously, sterilization may be an effective in-
tervention when balancing social externalities and economic costs with
reproductive rights.70 To avoid impersonal and unnecessary judicial in-
61. Id.
62. See George J. Annas, Mengele's Birthmark: The Nuremberg Code in United States
Courts, 7 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 17 (1991).
63. SMITH, supra note 5, at 117, 120-21.
64. Id. at 120-21 ("In the total array of real reasons that lead a woman to abort a
pregnancy, fetal transplant donations will remain of very dubious 'significance."') (endnote
omitted).
65. Id. at 129.
66. Id. at 127, 130; see also Daniel J. Garry et al., Are There Really Alternatives to the
Use of Fetal Tissue from Elective Abortions in Transplantation Research?, 327 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1592, 1592, 1595 (1992) (arguing that there are no reasonable alternative sources of
fetal tissue for transplantation research other than that obtained from electively aborted
fetuses).
67. SMITH, supra note 5, at 122-23, 130.
68. Id. at 130.
69. Id. at 171.
70. Id. at 186 ("A case-by-case or situational ethic will, of necessity, guide decision
makers rather than blanket prohibitions either for or against sterilization."); see also id. at
210 (After examining a wealth of Supreme Court precedent, Smith concludes that "'pro-
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terference with these decisions, Smith too sees the parent-guardian and
the family as the person or vehicle "most able and responsible to protect
and advance the best interests of the mentally handicapped or incompe-
tent,"'" with the attending physician as the check on familial abuse of
discretion.72
For those lawyers and judges who believe that scholars often overlook
the practical arena in which the law operates, chapter six, entitled
"Wrongful Life or Wrongful Birth," is remarkable. After examining the
commonalities among these causes of action,73 Smith recommends an or-
dinary action in negligence filed by the family, which neither "ignore[s]
causation issues" nor requires "doctors to employ every available diag-
nostic test."74 In this area of the law, Smith prudently considers the costs
of defensive medicine75 and liability insurance76 that inevitably increase
as a result of these causes of action and the benefits of recovery to the
family "confronted with the sad but unfortunately true fact that life in an
impaired state is, in extreme circumstances, wrongful. 7
In chapter eight, titled "Surrogation," Smith criticizes the family courts
of this country for their singlemindedness in failing to provide "an accu-
rate assessment of the child's best interest" and for their failure to assess
creative autonomy includes both the right to remain fertile and the right to avoid concep-
tion,' but nothing more.") (endnote omitted).
71. Id. at 186 (endnote omitted).
72. But see, e.g., Recent Case, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1426, 1426, 1429 (1992) (The court
in In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991), "failed to recognize that families and physi-
cians making termination decisions may not always take the best interest of the patient into
account or may place too much emphasis on factors other than the patient's best interest.")
(footnote omitted).
73. SMITH, supra note 5, at 160 ("When viewed together, claims of wrongful life and
wrongful birth are basically identical." (endnote omitted)); see also id. ("Moreover, in both
actions, the monetary result is usually the same-either an infant or his parents recovers
money for medical costs.") (endnote omitted).
74. Id. at 160-61.
75. "In order to avoid subsequent malpractice suits, the doctors - in turn - will
practice 'defensive medicine' thereby raising the frequency in which both genetic counsel-
ing and prenatal testing are utilized in cases when they would not otherwise be used." Id.
at 156; see also id. at 161 ("Thus, to avoid the costs associated with defensive medicine,
courts should not require doctors to employ every available diagnostic test, and further,
should carefully limit damages in order to discourage doctors from haphazardly recom-
mending abortions just because they fear liability.").
76. "Those physicians who do remain will be forced to pass along the costs of higher
malpractice premiums to their patients in the form of higher fees." Id. at 156 (endnote
omitted).
77. Id. at 160. Perhaps in this area, as well as others described by Smith, the attention
of state legislators is required. See id. at 215 ("The legislative branch of government is far
better equipped to deal with [surrogation] than the executive or judicial branches.").
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"adequate care for the child" in the final surrogation decision.7" Smith
thereby debunks the familiar popular emphasis on "extra-constitutional
moral and political norms" in the deliberative process and focuses instead
on deriving a "practical rule" from the legislative morality expressed in a
statute.79 This is accomplished with a marked emphasis not on parental
tribulations but rather on "the assurance that the child's health and devel-
opment will not be jeopardized or indeed compromised.""0 To imple-
ment this goal, Smith employs his situational balancing test81 and
recognizes that, "[i]f the goal of law is to maximize the welfare or utility
of all human beings, a prima facie case could be posited for according
children some measure of legal protection against their parents., 8 2
Although Professor Smith recognizes and endorses the benefits that
can be derived by infertile couples through the use of surrogation and
new reproductive technologies, he also emphasizes "the risks of abuse
inherent in the 'solution."'83 He minimizes those risks by focusing on the
values and duties owed by individuals and society to the endeavor of
bringing life into this world. Paramount among these are protecting and
promoting the best interests of the child.8 4 Bravo!
In chapter nine, entitled "Fetal Abuse," Smith continues this theme by
describing the shocking potential (or reality) of the creation of a "bio-
underclass:"85 babies who emerge from the womb and suffer "irrepara-
ble dysfunctional development" as a result of their mothers' addiction to
drugs or alcohol. Because by one estimate 375,000 babies have been ex-
posed to drugs in the womb, 6 Smith takes a no nonsense approach to
fetal abuse and supports the emerging trend among states to abolish the
doctrine of parental immunity. 7 Indeed, Smith recognizes that "[tihe law
78. Id. at 199.
79. Id. at 202 (endnote omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 200 (listing factors).
82. Id. at 200-01 (endnote omitted).
83. Id. at 220.
84. Id. at 219 ("Although I find nothing abhorrent with the development of legislation
validating surrogate contracts, I find a greater comfort in having the court seek a reason-
able balance of competing interests in determining where the disputed child's best interests
may be assured and protected."); see also Cynthia L. Gallee, Comment, Surrogate Mother
Contracts: A View of Recent Legislative Approaches, 25 J. HEALTh & Hosp. L. 175, 179
(1992) (endorsing the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act because it
"will avoid uncertainties in the law and protect the best interest of children born as a result
of advances in reproductive technology").
85. SMITH, supra note 5, at 235.
86. Id. at 243.
87. Id. at 236, 239.
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must respond by imposing liability for such actions - preferably re-edu-
cation and rehabilitation [of mothers]; but, in certain cases, civil damages,
imprisonment and eve[n] sterilization."'  In his analysis, Smith debunks
both the notion that such liability will spawn a prenatal police force89 and
the notion that a woman who "knowingly jeopardizes or even perma-
nently injures her fetus"9 is anything more than a biological conduit who
ignores the "honor and responsibility" of motherhood. 1
In order to avoid the societal disregard of "the coordinate responsibil-
ity attendant to the procreative right of autonomy under the guise of the
prenatal immunity doctrine" and the resulting debasement (or perver-
sion) of "the whole status of motherhood, the family, and thus, society,"'92
Smith advocates the use of section 895(G) and Comment K of the Second




In Bioethics and the Law, Smith succeeds in making his collection of
essays accessible both to those already initiated into the challenges of the
twenty-first century and to those, like this reviewer, who are suffering
from some antiquated conceptions about bioethics. Indeed, in the discus-
sion of surrogation, the reader will learn the alarming fact that, "[w]ith
the startling new advances in reproductive technology, or what has been
termed 'collaborative conception,' it is now possible for a child to have up
to five 'parents': an egg donor, a sperm donor, a surrogate mother who
gestates the fetus and the couple who actually raises the child." 94
The text, moreover, is both descriptive and normative, and the
88. Id. at 236; see also id. at 244, 247-48 (discussing the possibilities (and side effects)
of Norplant in the sterilization decision).
89. Id. at 236, 244.
90. Id. at 246.
91. Id. at 247; see also id. at 246 ("The level of personal dignity accorded each member
of society is contingent upon a level of full membership in a moral community - for the
social contract each has within that community creates duties and obligations and a level of
responsibility upon breach of that agreement.") (endnote omitted); id. at 236 ("Just as
general obligations are imposed upon all individuals to refrain from harming infants after
their birth, so too must society impose similar obligations [t]o assure that a mother's prena-
tal actions are consistent with this duty to protect children.") (endnote omitted).
92. Id. at 246.
93. Id. ("The gains to the child'[and future children] would be weighed against the
harm to the child's mother as a consequence of adopting such a policy.") (endnote
omitted).
94. Id. at 197.
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endnotes provide a comprehensive source for scholars, judges, lawyers,
doctors, and nurses mired in one of the many situational dilemmas
presented.95 Although the emphasis of Bioethics and the Law is on the
interaction between law, ethics, and science, Smith does not neglect reli-
gious96 and policy (i.e., political)' issues, demonstrating his sensitivity,
thoroughness, and pragmatism. Bioethics and the Law is therefore useful
and thorough for the general reader of contemporary medical ethics who
desires both a critical and topical examination of them. It is, in addition,
a valuable text for students to supplement the standard case book, for it
will no doubt prove provocative. Finally, Bioethics and the Law has both
a concise and sustained thesis, which is the mark of a truly integrated
work, and, as such, should be read and used by lawyers, judges, legisla-
tors, doctors, and nurses not only for its intellectual creativity98 and hon-
esty but also for its laudable concern for both individuals and society
confronting the present (and forthcoming) biomedical dilemmas of the
twenty-first century. As Donald G. Casswell, Professor and Associate
Dean of the School of Law at the University of Victoria, stated: "His
book deserves a place on the shelf of anyone seriously interested in the
new biology."99
95. The reader will undoubtedly be impressed with the wealth of American and inter-
national scholarship, statutes, case law, and press articles contained in this volume. By my
estimate, the endnotes number over one hundred pages.
96. See, e.g., id. at 94-96 (religiously motivated refusals); id. at 128 (although it is a
"legitimate act of faith to postulate that fetuses are persons.., there is no absolute way to
.prove or establish its validity."); id. at 156-57 (wrongful life and wrongful birth).
97. See, e.g., id. at 126 ("What is seen very clearly here is the inextricable relationship
between abortion and fetal research and experimentation and-even more importantly-a
similar inextricability between politics and morality.") (endnotes omitted); id. at 97 ("Even
today, patients and their physicians-as well as political leaders--continue to press harder
for even more rapid testing and approval of investigational drugs.") (endnote omitted); id.
at 214-15 (describing as constitutionilly proper and in the child's best interest a state's
limitation on artificial insemination and surrogation to married, consenting couples).
98. For example, based upon his expertise and teaching in property law, Professor
Smith proposes an intradisciplinary approach to deal with cryonic suspension before death:
namely, a modified wait-and-see doctrine which would allow a person "in state of cryonic
suspension twenty-one years without fear of being pronounced dead," at which time a
court would determine, upon settling the estate, whether the state of medical art reveals a
possible or feasible cure for the disease. Id. at 269-70.
99. Id. at back bookcover.

